Science 30 Years After Explosion, Challenger Engineer Still Blames Himself - Page 5

listopencil · 01-28-2016, 07:02 PM

Thirty years ago, as the nation mourned the loss of seven astronauts on the space shuttle Challenger, Bob Ebeling was steeped in his own deep grief. The night before the launch, Ebeling and four other engineers at NASA contractor Morton Thiokol had tried to stop the launch. Their managers and NASA overruled them. That night, he told his wife, Darlene, "It's going to blow up." When Challenger exploded 73 seconds after liftoff, Ebeling and his colleagues sat stunned in a conference room at Thiokol's headquarters outside Brigham City, Utah. They watched the spacecraft explode on a giant television screen and they knew exactly what had happened.

Three weeks later, Ebeling and another engineer separately and anonymously detailed to NPR the first account of that contentious pre-launch meeting. Both were despondent and in tears as they described hours of data review and arguments. The data showed that the rubber seals on the shuttle's booster rockets wouldn't seal properly in cold temperatures and this would be the coldest launch ever. Ebeling, now 89, decided to let NPR identify him this time, on the 30th anniversary of the Challenger explosion. "I was one of the few that was really close to the situation," Ebeling recalls. "Had they listened to me and wait[ed] for a weather change, it might have been a completely different outcome." We spoke in the same house, kitchen and living room that we spoke in 30 years ago, when Ebeling didn't want his name used or his voice recorded. He was afraid he would lose his job.

"I think the truth has to come out," he says about the decision to speak privately then. "NASA ruled the launch," he explains. "They had their mind set on going up and proving to the world they were right and they knew what they were doing. But they didn't." A presidential commission found flaws in the space agency's decision-making process. But it's still not clear why NASA was so anxious to launch without delay. The space shuttle program had an ambitious launch schedule that year and NASA wanted to show it could launch regularly and reliably. President Ronald Reagan was also set to deliver the State of the Union address that evening and reportedly planned to tout the Challenger launch. Whatever the reason, Ebeling says it didn't justify the risk. "There was more than enough [NASA officials and Thiokol managers] there to say, 'Hey, let's give it another day or two,' " Ebeling recalls. "But no one did."

Ebeling retired soon after Challenger. He suffered deep depression and has never been able to lift the burden of guilt. In 1986, as he watched that haunting image again on a television screen, he said, "I could have done more. I should have done more." He says the same thing today, sitting in a big easy chair in the same living room, his eyes watery and his face grave. The data he and his fellow engineers presented, and their persistent and sometimes angry arguments, weren't enough to sway Thiokol managers and NASA officials. Ebeling concludes he was inadequate. He didn't argue the data well enough. A religious man, this is something he has prayed about for the past 30 years. "I think that was one of the mistakes that God made," Ebeling says softly. "He shouldn't have picked me for the job. But next time I talk to him, I'm gonna ask him, 'Why me? You picked a loser.' "

I reminded him of something his late colleague and friend Roger Boisjoly once told me. Boisjoly was the other Thiokol engineer who spoke anonymously with NPR 30 years ago. He came to believe that he and Ebeling and their colleagues did all they could. "We were talking to the right people," Boisjoly told me. "We were talking to the people who had the power to stop that launch." "Maybe," Ebeling says with a weak wave as I leave. "Maybe Roger's right."

http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-w...blames-himself

**Rain Man** · 01-29-2016, 07:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by beach tribe

Is this true??

That's impressive.

Pretty true.

I don't know what my odds of being hired were, and they were probably exceedingly low since they'd turned me down for an internship the previous year, but it was nonetheless a goal.

Fortunately, I had a backup plan for the internship the previous year of working in a restaurant by the interstate. That added experience might've pushed me over the threshold for NASA.

**Rausch** · 01-29-2016, 07:09 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by kysirsoze

Damn.

After reading that I'm shocked he hasn't stepped in front of a train already...

eDave · 01-29-2016, 07:11 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rausch

After reading that I'm shocked he hasn't stepped in front of a train already...

Yea. That's pretty heavy.

eDave · 01-29-2016, 07:12 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by smellypitts

without trying to sounding bad here......no there isnt...I dont know that I was remarkably affected aside from not wanting to see a morbid televised death.

I hate space travel. The thought of being in space scares me...floating to no where

You make my balls itch.

And you are floating to everywhere. Get cosmic dude. It will change your life.

DanT · 01-29-2016, 07:32 PM

The arguments between the engineers and management the night before the launch have received some attention in the fields of statistics, engineering and management. Statisticians, including myself, have used it as an example of where a lack of statistical sophistication hindered the engineers from being able to produce convincing statistical graphics to support their arguments on the night before the launch. But that's not really the full story. An interesting paper that challenges the overly simplistic interpretation of that night as simply a matter of statistical incompetence is the following:
Tufte and the Morton Thiokol Engineers on the Challenger
by Wade Robison et al
Science and Engineering Ethics, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2002
https://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/FINRobison.pdf

With regard to the "blood on their hands" interpretation, that's not really fair. The managers were not trying to get anybody killed, they just weren't as receptive to the concerns of the engineers as they should have been, partly due to failures in communication. The above cited paper also gets into ethical considerations, though with respect to the engineers.

Dayze · 01-29-2016, 07:44 PM

I watched some show/special the other night on the anniversary, I think, called "Challenger: The Lost Tapes". It was really interesting, and definitely made it really personal. I mean, I was always sad about the incident, but after seeing the crew in videos that had sort of a home video vibe, and some of the interviews Christa M. did....and the things she said, were just brutal in terms of unknowingly foreshadowing her future. Really sad.

she seemed like a really cool lady.

listopencil · 01-29-2016, 08:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rausch

After reading that I'm shocked he hasn't stepped in front of a train already...

Yeah. You can tell he is just carrying that around with him and probably will until the day he dies.

**mlyonsd** · 01-29-2016, 08:11 PM

My son was at a conference where one of the engineers that tried to stop the launch was the keynote speaker. He went into details of why they objected including the data that was used.

My son said it was a pretty riveting speech.

Squalor2 · 01-29-2016, 08:35 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rain Man

Pretty true.

I don't know what my odds of being hired were, and they were probably exceedingly low since they'd turned me down for an internship the previous year, but it was nonetheless a goal.

Fortunately, I had a backup plan for the internship the previous year of working in a restaurant by the interstate. That added experience might've pushed me over the threshold for NASA.

are you drunk?

Dayze · 01-29-2016, 08:39 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Squalor2

are you drunk?

Rain Man doesn't drink.

He sniffs glue.

Like the rest of us.

Squalor2 · 01-29-2016, 08:52 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dayze

Rain Man doesn't drink.

He sniffs glue.

Like the rest of us.

you know as well as i do, we arent rain men.

Dayze · 01-29-2016, 09:12 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Squalor2

you know as well as i do, we arent rain men.

don't listen to my dumbass. it's the glue talking.

Squalor2 · 01-29-2016, 09:46 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dayze

don't listen to my dumbass. it's the glue talking.

bout time, you are the dangerfield of this place.

Johnny Vegas · 01-29-2016, 10:03 PM

Some say they're still alive

listopencil · 01-29-2016, 10:25 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Johnny Vegas

Some say they're still alive

Ellen DeGeneres and Henry David Thoreau

01-28-2016, 07:02 PM
listopencil Immanentize The Eschaton Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: In Partibus Infidelium Casino cash: $1905880	30 Years After Explosion, Challenger Engineer Still Blames Himself Thirty years ago, as the nation mourned the loss of seven astronauts on the space shuttle Challenger, Bob Ebeling was steeped in his own deep grief. The night before the launch, Ebeling and four other engineers at NASA contractor Morton Thiokol had tried to stop the launch. Their managers and NASA overruled them. That night, he told his wife, Darlene, "It's going to blow up." When Challenger exploded 73 seconds after liftoff, Ebeling and his colleagues sat stunned in a conference room at Thiokol's headquarters outside Brigham City, Utah. They watched the spacecraft explode on a giant television screen and they knew exactly what had happened. Three weeks later, Ebeling and another engineer separately and anonymously detailed to NPR the first account of that contentious pre-launch meeting. Both were despondent and in tears as they described hours of data review and arguments. The data showed that the rubber seals on the shuttle's booster rockets wouldn't seal properly in cold temperatures and this would be the coldest launch ever. Ebeling, now 89, decided to let NPR identify him this time, on the 30th anniversary of the Challenger explosion. "I was one of the few that was really close to the situation," Ebeling recalls. "Had they listened to me and wait[ed] for a weather change, it might have been a completely different outcome." We spoke in the same house, kitchen and living room that we spoke in 30 years ago, when Ebeling didn't want his name used or his voice recorded. He was afraid he would lose his job. "I think the truth has to come out," he says about the decision to speak privately then. "NASA ruled the launch," he explains. "They had their mind set on going up and proving to the world they were right and they knew what they were doing. But they didn't." A presidential commission found flaws in the space agency's decision-making process. But it's still not clear why NASA was so anxious to launch without delay. The space shuttle program had an ambitious launch schedule that year and NASA wanted to show it could launch regularly and reliably. President Ronald Reagan was also set to deliver the State of the Union address that evening and reportedly planned to tout the Challenger launch. Whatever the reason, Ebeling says it didn't justify the risk. "There was more than enough [NASA officials and Thiokol managers] there to say, 'Hey, let's give it another day or two,' " Ebeling recalls. "But no one did." Ebeling retired soon after Challenger. He suffered deep depression and has never been able to lift the burden of guilt. In 1986, as he watched that haunting image again on a television screen, he said, "I could have done more. I should have done more." He says the same thing today, sitting in a big easy chair in the same living room, his eyes watery and his face grave. The data he and his fellow engineers presented, and their persistent and sometimes angry arguments, weren't enough to sway Thiokol managers and NASA officials. Ebeling concludes he was inadequate. He didn't argue the data well enough. A religious man, this is something he has prayed about for the past 30 years. "I think that was one of the mistakes that God made," Ebeling says softly. "He shouldn't have picked me for the job. But next time I talk to him, I'm gonna ask him, 'Why me? You picked a loser.' " I reminded him of something his late colleague and friend Roger Boisjoly once told me. Boisjoly was the other Thiokol engineer who spoke anonymously with NPR 30 years ago. He came to believe that he and Ebeling and their colleagues did all they could. "We were talking to the right people," Boisjoly told me. "We were talking to the people who had the power to stop that launch." "Maybe," Ebeling says with a weak wave as I leave. "Maybe Roger's right." http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-w...blames-himself
Posts: 55,992

01-29-2016, 07:32 PM	#65
DanT Veteran Join Date: Sep 2000 Location: Davis, CA Casino cash: $4251711	The arguments between the engineers and management the night before the launch have received some attention in the fields of statistics, engineering and management. Statisticians, including myself, have used it as an example of where a lack of statistical sophistication hindered the engineers from being able to produce convincing statistical graphics to support their arguments on the night before the launch. But that's not really the full story. An interesting paper that challenges the overly simplistic interpretation of that night as simply a matter of statistical incompetence is the following: Tufte and the Morton Thiokol Engineers on the Challenger by Wade Robison et al Science and Engineering Ethics, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2002 https://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/FINRobison.pdf With regard to the "blood on their hands" interpretation, that's not really fair. The managers were not trying to get anybody killed, they just weren't as receptive to the concerns of the engineers as they should have been, partly due to failures in communication. The above cited paper also gets into ethical considerations, though with respect to the engineers. Last edited by DanT; 01-29-2016 at 08:15 PM..
Posts: 4,231

01-29-2016, 07:44 PM	#66
Dayze Resident Glue Sniffer Join Date: Nov 2003 Casino cash: $4909358	I watched some show/special the other night on the anniversary, I think, called "Challenger: The Lost Tapes". It was really interesting, and definitely made it really personal. I mean, I was always sad about the incident, but after seeing the crew in videos that had sort of a home video vibe, and some of the interviews Christa M. did....and the things she said, were just brutal in terms of unknowingly foreshadowing her future. Really sad. she seemed like a really cool lady. __________________ Life is 99% inspiration, 1% Perspiration, and 1% Attention to Detial. RIP & Godspeed: Saccoppo Lonewolf Ed Fire Me Boy
Posts: 37,377

01-29-2016, 08:11 PM	#68
mlyonsd Supporter Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Spink, SD Casino cash: $1353762	My son was at a conference where one of the engineers that tried to stop the launch was the keynote speaker. He went into details of why they objected including the data that was used. My son said it was a pretty riveting speech.
Posts: 38,915

01-29-2016, 10:03 PM	#74
Johnny Vegas MVP Join Date: May 2008 Casino cash: $5613814	Some say they're still alive Attached Thumbnails
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