[OnTheWarpath15]

But INT's are the debbil! (you'll need to click the link to read the tables)

http://www.footballperspective.com/g...ons-overrated/

Are Interceptions Overrated?

There’s nothing worse than throwing an interception. Everyone seems to agree on this, from fans to media to advanced stats guys. But is it really true? In this quick study, I looked at the tradeoff between interception avoidance and aggressive downfield passing to see which strategy has a larger impact on winning. To measure this, I created two categories of quarterbacks: Game Managers and Gunslingers.

First, the Game Managers, which includes all post-merger quarterback seasons with an INT%+ of at least 1101 and a NY/A+ of 90 or below (min 224 attempts).2 These guys avoided picks but failed to move the ball efficiently, the hallmark of a conservative playing style.

There are 65 seasons fitting this criteria, and the results are not pretty. Collectively, these quarterbacks compiled a record of 339-446-4, for a .432 winning percentage. The Game Managers list is populated by many of the worst modern passers, including notorious busts such as Gabbert, Russell, Harrington, and Boller, plus a host of rookies and washed up veterans. One can certainly go too far when it comes to sacrificing yardage as a way to avoid interceptions.3

Now, the Gunslingers. For this category, I simply flipped the two variables, meaning passers with a NY/A+ of at least 110 and an INT%+ of 90 or less. These quarterbacks employed a high risk/high reward strategy, aggressively moving the ball downfield, interceptions be damned.

There are 46 Gunslinger seasons since 1970, and these quarterbacks were far more successful than their conservative counterparts. The group went 363-229-2, for a .613 winning percentage. Even if we only consider the 15 seasons with an INT%+ of 80 or worse, the combined winning percentage is still .585.4 It appears that quarterbacks can get away with high interception rates as long as they move the ball efficiently. Why are Gunslingers so successful? And why are there so many Game Manager types in the modern game, when it doesn’t usually lead to winning?

First off, I think we need to redefine what throwing a pick actually means. Most observers equate throwing interceptions with recklessness, carelessness, inability to read coverage, and poor accuracy. No question those attributions may be true in specific cases. But I see a different, more encouraging corollary: Throwing interceptions is a byproduct of aggressive, optimal quarterbacking. The interceptions themselves are not good, but the willingness to risk throwing them is. Benjamin Morris has mentioned this phenomenon several times in his FiveThirtyEight research, specifically with regard to Andrew Luck and Aaron Rodgers.

Despite throwing a high number of picks, Luck has consistently won games, and erased double digit deficits in many of those victories. While interceptions are damaging to his overall stats (both traditional and advanced), his risk/reward balance is probably closer to optimal than any other quarterback in the league, especially considering his relatively weak supporting cast. In contrast, take a closer look at Aaron Rodgers. Despite owning the lowest interception rate in NFL history, he has a middling record in close games, and a downright terrible record when coming from behind. Why? He’s not taking the risks necessary to optimize his chances of winning. Even when trailing, which calls for a more aggressive strategy, Rodgers will usually take a sack rather than force a throw downfield. Avoiding interceptions keeps his stats looking pretty, but he has almost certainly left several wins on the table in the process.

This is not a theory without support from the analytics crowd. Brian Burke wrote something similar with respect to Jason Campbell in 2008. Jason Lisk also produced some interesting research on the subject, and Doug Drinen once wrote about how avoiding turnovers is like showing up to the airport too early.

I would hypothesize that aggression is even more important in the playoffs, where the one-and-done format favors a high variance strategy, especially for the underdog. Consider the unlikely Super Bowl runs over the past decade; every one of those teams had a Gunslinger type QB (Joe Flacco in 2012, Eli Manning in 2011 and 2007, Kurt Warner in 2008, Jake Delhomme in 2003). While all of them look terrible when things go wrong, their high risk styles give their teams a chance even when they’re overmatched. Everyone makes fun of Jake Delhomme for his 5 INT meltdown in the 2008 playoffs, but he also threw an 85 yard TD bomb to tie Super Bowl XXXVIII with under two minutes left.

As lucky as the Helmet Catch was, Eli Manning deserves credit for even attempting that pass; if he had taken the sack or thrown a checkdown, the Giants surely would have lost. Who can forget Joe Flacco’s 70 yard TD to force OT against the Broncos, which literally saved his team’s season? Now imagine Sam Bradford or Jason Campbell making these plays. In your dreams.

Given this evidence, why are so many quarterbacks afraid of throwing an interception? In my opinion, it’s the same psychology that causes coaches to be risk averse on fourth downs. Even though the aggressive strategy is better in the long run, they know they’ll be raked through the coals when their gambles don’t pay off. Let me share the example that inspired this study in the first place:

In week 13, Denver and Kansas City met on Sunday Night Football. With 25 seconds left in the fourth quarter, the Chiefs faced a fourth and 19 at their own 8-yard line down by 13 points. No, Kansas City was not going to win the game, but what did Alex Smith do? He ran out of bounds behind the line of scrimmage! Let that sink in. Even in a situation where there was zero downside to throwing an interception, Smith was still too risk averse to even attempt a pass. But in spite of this decision, he was spared any criticism from the media, and this game was on national TV! Then consider the reaction when Tony Romo or Peyton Manning throws a late interception in a comeback attempt; they’re excoriated from coast and coast for trying to make something happen. The incentives are backwards, just like they are for coaches. And given that these are human beings with their jobs potentially on the line, it’s no wonder some choose to walk on the safe side.